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ER 1859 X 4 / 1 87

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ER 1859 X / 6 87

SUBJECT: *Invitation to
Address Princeton
Conference*

ER 1859X/6 87

WALTER L. PFORZHEIMER

STAT

19 October 1987

Hon. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

STAT

Dear Bob:

First, let me thank you (and for sending me the text of your Princeton speech. It was first class, and needed saying. But would you forgive me for suggesting that there is, in my opinion, an error where you may have been factually misinformed?

On p. 22 of the text, you talk of DCI McCone and the Cuban Missile Crisis; and there you state, correctly, that Mr. McCone was right in his remarks to President Kennedy, but that, you are told, that "this cost him his relationship with the President". I do not know who was the source of your statement, "I was told", but I believe that to be totally inaccurate. Today, I have talked to the two people who were perhaps the closest to Mr. McCone, and they are astounded by that statement.

As best as I can recollect it, Mr. McCone told President Kennedy, before he left on his honeymoon in France in August, 1962, that he believed that the USSR was putting missiles in Cuba; but that this was contrary to the National Intelligence Estimate; and that the President could not proceed on the DCI's "feelings", but would have to stay with the Estimate. In the end, as you say, the DCI was correct, but as far as I knew, this never caused a wavering in Mr. McCone's relations with the President. Until the tragic death of the President, he and Mr. McCone remained on very close professional and personal terms. In addition, Mr. McCone retained his close association with Bobby Kennedy. As a matter of fact, when the President was shot, Mr. McCone proceeded at once to Bobby's home at Hickory Hill in McLean, and remained with him for a considerable period of time while the Attorney General sorted out what needed to be done at the moment.

Mr. McCone's decline came after Lyndon Johnson became President. Johnson did not like McCone, largely, I believe, because he was so close to the Kennedy's. Nor did he like McCone's social connections with the Kennedy friends and other social lights. When the DCI had an appointment with Johnson, the latter would keep him waiting thirty or forty minutes. Nor did he include him in the "Tuesday luncheons" with Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy/Rostow. It was not until Dick Helms became the DCI that the latter was included in the "Tuesday luncheons". Mr. McCone grew tired of all this, and resigned.

✓ P 310-7A
CA B-802-1R

Hon. Robert M. Gates
19 October 1987
Page 2

One last point. AFIO much enjoyed your participation in our panel. Thank you. I have only to add that Major General Jack Thomas has stepped down after two terms as Chairman of the AFIO Board of Directors, and I have been elected to succeed him. Ray Wannall, our President and former Assistant Director of the FBI for Intelligence, has also stepped down, and is being succeeded as President by Rear Admiral Donald P. Harvey (USN, Ret.), formerly Director of Naval Intelligence and Chief of Staff of DIA. [redacted] Chuck Briggs has succeeded me as Vice President; Louis Tordella continues as Vice Chairman. STAT

Hoping that you will forgive these notes, I am, most sincerely,

[redacted]

Walter Pforzheimer

STAT

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

30 September 1987

TO: William Hyland
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
58 East 68th Street
New York, N.Y. 10021

As promised.



Robert M. Gates

STAT



P-310-1R

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
29 SEPTEMBER 1987

CIA AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

OVER THE YEARS, PUBLIC VIEWS OF CIA AND ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY HAVE BEEN SHAPED PRIMARILY BY MOVIES, TELEVISION, NOVELS, NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS BY JOURNALISTS, HEADLINES GROWING OUT OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES, EXPOSES BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AND ESSAYS BY EXPERTS WHO HAVE NEVER SERVED IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND BY SOME WHO HAVE SERVED AND STILL NEVER UNDERSTOOD OUR ROLE. WE ARE SAID TO BE AN INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT AND YET ARE THE MOST VISIBLE, MOST EXTERNALLY SCRUTINIZED AND MOST PUBLICIZED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD. WHILE WE SOMETIMES ARE ABLE TO REFUTE PUBLICLY ALLEGATIONS AND CRITICISM AGAINST US, USUALLY WE MUST REMAIN SILENT. THE RESULT IS A CONTRADICTORY MELANGE OF IMAGES OF CIA AND VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR REAL ROLE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

TONIGHT, I WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO ILLUMINATE, AND I HOPE EXPAND, YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF CIA'S ROLE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

THIS ROLE TAKES THREE BROAD FORMS:

- FIRST, CIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO POLICYMAKERS, PRINCIPALLY THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE -- ALTHOUGH IN RECENT YEARS MANY OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES HAVE BECOME MAJOR USERS OF INTELLIGENCE. THIS IS A WELL KNOWN AREA, AND I WILL SPEAK OF IT ONLY SUMMARILY.
- SECOND, CIA IS CHARGED WITH THE CONDUCT OF COVERT ACTION, THE ONE AREA WHERE WE IMPLEMENT POLICY. THIS IS A SUBJECT SO COMPLEX AND SO CONTROVERSIAL AS TO REQUIRE SEPARATE TREATMENT AT ANOTHER TIME, ANOTHER PLACE.
- THIRD, AND MOST SIGNIFICANT, CIA'S ROLE IS PLAYED OUT IN THE INTERACTION, PRIMARILY IN WASHINGTON, BETWEEN CIA AND THE POLICY COMMUNITY. IT IS IN THE DYNAMICS OF THIS RELATIONSHIP THAT THE INFLUENCE AND ROLE OF CIA ARE DETERMINED -- WHETHER CIA'S ASSESSMENTS ARE HEEDDED OR NOT, WHETHER CIA'S INFORMATION IS RELEVANT AND TIMELY ENOUGH TO BE USEFUL, AND WHETHER CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICYMAKERS FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE AND

PROBLEM TO PROBLEM, IS SUPPORTIVE OR ADVERSARIAL. IT IS THIS DYNAMIC INTERACTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY THAT IS THE LEAST WELL UNDERSTOOD AND IT IS THIS AREA THAT I WILL FOCUS ON TONIGHT.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, THE DCI, SERVES BOTH AS DIRECTOR OF CIA AND HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, WHICH ENCOMPASSES CIA; THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; THE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, TREASURY, ENERGY, AND THE FOUR MILITARY SERVICES; AND THE FBI. OF THESE, ONLY CIA IS COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT OF ANY POLICY DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY AND ACCEPTS REQUESTS FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FROM THROUGHOUT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. IT IS THE DCI AND CIA THAT SERVE AS THE PRINCIPAL CONDUITS OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PRINCIPALS.

WHAT THEN, DOES CIA DO? BECAUSE OF THE MEDIA'S FOCUS ON COVERT ACTION, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT OVER 95 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET IS DEVOTED TO THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. ABOUT THREE PERCENT OF CIA'S PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED IN COVERT ACTION.

COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

NOW, IF WE ARE NOT SPENDING MOST OF OUR TIME AND MONEY ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENTS, WHAT EXACTLY DOES CIA DO? AS JOHN RANELAGH SAYS IN HIS HISTORY OF CIA, "TO THE PRESENT THE CIA IS AN ECHO OF ITS FOUNDERS. ITS JOB IS NOT TO FIND ENEMIES BUT TO DEFINE THEM. ITS THEME IS THE SUBSTITUTION OF INTELLIGENCE FOR FORCE." CIA DEVOTES THE OVERWHELMING PREPONDERANCE OF ITS RESOURCES TO MONITORING AND REPORTING ON DAY TO DAY DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD, AND DETERMINING AND RESPONDING TO POLICYMAKERS' LONGER RANGE REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS.

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND HOW IS IT USED BY THE POLICYMAKER? OUR INFORMATION COMES FROM SATELLITES; NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS, RADIO, AND TELEVISION WORLDWIDE; DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY ATTACHES OVERSEAS; AND, OF COURSE, FROM SECRET AGENTS. THAT INFORMATION FLOWS TO WASHINGTON WHERE ANALYSTS, WITH BACKGROUNDS IN SCORES OF DISCIPLINES, SIFT THROUGH IT, EXAMINE IT, COLLATE IT, AND TRY TO MAKE SENSE OF THE BILLIONS OF BITS AND PIECES THAT COME TO US ON ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS WORLD-WIDE OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. WE THEN REPORT OUR FINDINGS TO POLICY OFFICIALS AND TO THE MILITARY.

WHAT CLEARLY DISTINGUISHES INFORMATION SUITABLE FOR INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION IS ITS RELEVANCE TO US POLICY AND US INTERESTS. IT IS THE COMPREHENSIVENESS OF OUR COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, THEIR FOCUS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE ADVANTAGE OF UNIQUE OR PRIOR KNOWLEDGE, THAT MAKE INTELLIGENCE VALUABLE TO THE POLICYMAKER. OFTEN, WE MAKE A CONTRIBUTION SIMPLY THROUGH OUR ABILITY TO ORGANIZE THE FACTS IN A CLEAR AND CONCISE WAY, BY PROVIDING THE SAME FACTS TO DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS, AND BY IDENTIFYING THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS -- AND BY TRYING TO ANSWER THEM.

THIS INFORMATION FINDS ITS WAY TO THE POLICYMAKER IN SEVERAL WAYS:

- FIRST, INTELLIGENCE ON DAY TO DAY EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD IS PROVIDED TO SENIOR OFFICIALS DAILY OR EVEN SEVERAL TIMES A DAY.
- SECOND, THE CIA CONTRIBUTES ANALYSIS TO POLICY PAPERS DESCRIBING BOTH EVENTS AT HAND AND POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES OR PROBLEMS FOR THE UNITED STATES. NEARLY ALL NSC AND SUB-CABINET MEETINGS BEGIN WITH AN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING.

- THIRD, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MAKING OF POLICY. THESE ESTIMATES ARE THE MOST FORMAL EXPRESSION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S VIEWS. ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTE TO AND COORDINATE ON WHAT IS SAID IN THESE ESTIMATES.

- FOURTH, POLICYMAKERS RECEIVE SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES. CIA'S ASSESSMENTS OR RESEARCH PROGRAM IS THE PRODUCT OF THE LARGEST INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATION IN THE WORLD. THE RANGE OF ISSUES IS BREATHTAKING -- FROM STRATEGIC WEAPONS TO FOOD SUPPLIES; EPIDEMIOLOGY TO SPACE; WATER AND CLIMATE TO THIRD WORLD POLITICAL INSTABILITY; MINERAL AND ENERGY RESOURCES TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCE; SOVIET LASER WEAPONS TO REMOTE TRIBAL DEMOGRAPHICS; CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION TO COMMODITY SUPPLIES; AND MANY, MANY MORE.

CIA-POLICY RELATIONSHIPS

SO FAR, SO GOOD. WHAT I HAVE JUST REVIEWED IS A TEXTBOOK DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE. IT IS NEAT, UNAMBIGUOUS, CLINICAL, NON-CONTROVERSIAL, EVEN COMMENDABLE -- AND HIGHLY MISLEADING. WHAT ABOUT USERS WHO LOOK NOT FOR DATA OR UNDERSTANDING, BUT FOR SUPPORT FOR DECISIONS ALREADY MADE; OR THOSE WHO SELECTIVELY USE OR MISSTATE INTELLIGENCE TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER POLICY; OR USERS WHO LABEL INTELLIGENCE THEY DISLIKE AS TOO SOFT, TOO HARD OR COOKED; OR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WITH THEIR OWN AGENDAS OR BIASES; OR THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY OF A CIA DIRECTOR HELD AT TOO GREAT A DISTANCE FROM THE PRESIDENT OR ONE WHO IS HELD TOO CLOSE; OR THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CONSTANTLY CHANGING EVALUATIONS, OR ANALYSIS THAT IS JUST PLAIN WRONG; OR THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE AS A POLITICAL FOOTBALL BETWEEN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS OR BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES? THE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR OF OFFICIALS IN CIA AND POLICY AGENCIES THAT LIE BEHIND THESE AND MANY SIMILAR ISSUES AND THE INTERACTION AMONG THEM COMPRISE THE DYNAMIC OF THE RELATIONSHIP -- WHAT PROFESSOR YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI OF HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM DESCRIBES AS "THE INTELLIGENCE-POLICYMAKER TANGLE."

IN 1949, SHERMAN KENT, IN HIS BOOK STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICAN WORLD POLICY, SAID "THERE IS NO PHASE OF THE INTELLIGENCE BUSINESS WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE ITSELF AND THE PEOPLE WHO USE ITS PRODUCT. ODDLY ENOUGH, THIS RELATIONSHIP, WHICH ONE WOULD EXPECT TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AUTOMATICALLY, DOES NOT DO THIS."

THE FACT IS THAT, OVER THE YEARS, THE POLICYMAKER AND THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER HAVE CONSISTENTLY -- AND WITH FRIGHTENINGLY FEW EXCEPTIONS -- COME TOGETHER HUGELY IGNORANT OF THE REALITIES AND COMPLEXITIES OF EACH OTHER'S WORLD -- PROCESS, TECHNIQUE, FORM AND CULTURE. CIA OFFICERS CAN TELL YOU IN EXCRUCIATING DETAIL HOW FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE IN EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD SAVE ONE -- THE UNITED STATES. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS SUGGESTED BY PROFESSOR HARKABI, THE UNHAPPINESS OF INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE SWELLS "WHEN THEY COMPARE THE SOPHISTICATION AND ADVANCED METHODS EMPLOYED IN COLLECTION OF THE INFORMATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE CAVALIER FASHION OR IMPROVISATION WITH WHICH POLICY DECISIONS ARE MANY A TIME REACHED."

BOOKSHELVES GROAN UNDER THE LITERATURE OF PROPOSED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WHEN THESE TWO WORLDS COLLIDE. IN 1956, FOR EXAMPLE, ROGER HILSMAN WROTE THAT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCERS MUST "ORIENT THEMSELVES FRANKLY AND CONSCIOUSLY TOWARD POLICY AND ACTION ... ADAPTING TOOLS EXPRESSLY TO THE NEEDS OF POLICY."

OTHERS, AS DESCRIBED IN ONE INTELLIGENCE MONOGRAPH, ARGUED THAT "THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCER SHOULD INITIATE NO DIRECT INTERACTION WITH HIS CONSUMERS, BUT RATHER SHOULD RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR DATA AND ANALYSIS."

SHERMAN KENT OF YALE AND THEN OF CIA WAS PERHAPS THE FIRST OF THE EARLY INTELLIGENCE COMMENTATORS TO SEE THE NEED FOR A DIFFERENT, MORE DIRECT AND INTENSIVE INTERACTION BETWEEN POLICYMAKER AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. WARNING THAT PROTECTING THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST COULD BE LIKENED TO PILING ARMOR ON A MEDIEVAL KNIGHT UNTIL HE WAS ABSOLUTELY SAFE BUT COMPLETELY USELESS, KENT CONCLUDED THAT THE GREATER DANGER TO AN EFFECTIVE ROLE WAS IN BEING TOO DISTANT. EVEN SO, HE FORESAW A TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP -- THAT INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS' SKEPTICISM OF POLICYMAKERS' OBJECTIVITY -- AND THE LATTER'S CONSEQUENT RESENTMENT -- WOULD STULTIFY A FREE GIVE AND TAKE BETWEEN THEM; THAT POLICYMAKERS WOULD SEE THE VERY FACT OF CIA ASSESSMENTS AS AN INSULT TO THEIR OWN INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITIES; THAT SECURITY CONCERNS BY EACH PARTY WOULD ENCOURAGE WARINESS AND RETICENCE. AND, IN TRUTH, THESE AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES STILL LARGELY SHAPE CIA'S ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS.

LET ME ELABORATE ON THESE DIFFICULTIES -- ON THE REALITY OF A ROUGH AND TUMBLE WORLD -- BASED ON PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN BOTH WORLDS AT DIFFERENT TIMES UNDER FIVE PRESIDENTS.

THE INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE -- OF CIA -- IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. WHILE THIS CONFERS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES, ABOVE ALL INDEPENDENCE, SUCH AUTONOMY ALSO IMBUES THE CIA-POLICY COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP WITH A SIGNIFICANT ADVERSARIAL AS WELL AS SUPPORTIVE CONTENT. AND, THE POLICYMAKER HAS A LONG LIST OF GRIEVANCES, MANY LEGITIMATE, SOME NOT.

-- POLICYMAKERS LEGITIMATELY WANT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT WILL INFORM AND GUIDE THEIR TACTICAL DAY TO DAY DECISIONMAKING. IN SOME AREAS, WE CAN AND DO MEET THEIR NEEDS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN 1980, THANKS TO A VERY BRAVE MAN, WE WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE STEP BY STEP PREPARATIONS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. IN EARLY 1986, WE WERE ABLE TO DOCUMENT IN EXTRAORDINARY DETAIL ELECTORAL CHEATING IN THE PHILIPPINES. THERE ARE EVEN SOME AREAS WHERE OUR INTELLIGENCE IS SO GOOD THAT IT REDUCES POLICYMAKERS FLEXIBILITY AND ROOM FOR MANEUVER. YET, I WOULD HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE COUNTRIES AND ISSUES IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES WHERE SUCH TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE -- MOST OFTEN POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE -- IS SORELY DEFICIENT AND POLICYMAKER COMPLAINTS ARE JUSTIFIED. OUR CAPABILITIES ARE MUCH IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS, BUT STILL UNEVEN. AND NO

MATTER HOW GOOD WE ARE, THERE WILL STILL BE SURPRISES OR GAPS.

-- IT WILL NOT SURPRISE YOU THAT VERY FEW POLICYMAKERS WELCOME CIA INFORMATION WHICH DIRECTLY OR BY INFERENCE CHALLENGES THE SUCCESS OR ADEQUACY OF THEIR POLICIES OR THE ACCURACY OF THEIR PRONOUNCEMENTS. INDEED, DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, A CONSTANT REFRAIN FROM POLICYMAKERS WAS, "AREN'T YOU GUYS ON THE TEAM?" YET, I CONCEDE THAT ON MORE THAN A FEW OCCASIONS, POLICYMAKERS HAVE ANALYZED OR FORECAST DEVELOPMENTS BETTER THAN WE. AND, TRUTH BE KNOWN, ANALYSTS HAVE SOMETIMES GONE OVERBOARD TO PROVE A POLICYMAKER WRONG. WHEN SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BEHIND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, ANALYSTS INITIALLY SET OUT NOT TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE IN ALL ITS ASPECTS BUT RATHER TO PROVE THE SECRETARY WRONG -- TO PROVE SIMPLY THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT ORCHESTRATE ALL INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. BUT IN SO DOING, THEY WENT TOO FAR THEMSELVES AND FAILED IN EARLY DRAFTS TO DESCRIBE EXTENSIVE AND WELL-DOCUMENTED INDIRECT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST GROUPS AND THEIR SPONSORS. FAR FROM KOW-TOWING TO THE POLICYMAKER, THERE IS SOMETIMES A STRONG IMPULSE ON THE PART OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS TO SHOW THAT A POLICY OR DECISION IS MISGUIDED OR WRONG, TO POKE AN ANALYTICAL FINGER IN THE POLICY EYE.

POLICYMAKERS KNOW THIS AND UNDERSTANDABLY RESENT IT. TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ANALYST WHILE KEEPING SUCH IMPULSES IN CHECK IS ONE OF THE TOUGHEST JOBS OF INTELLIGENCE MANAGERS.

- IN THIS CONNECTION, THE POLICYMAKER SOMETIMES HAS THE SENSE THAT CIA IS ATTEMPTING, AT LEAST BY INFERENCE, TO "GRADE" HIS PERFORMANCE. FURTHER, THE POLICYMAKER IS OFTEN SUSPICIOUS THAT WHEN CIA'S ANALYSIS SUGGESTS POLICY IS FAILING OR IN DIFFICULTY, THESE CONCLUSIONS ARE, WITH MALICE, WIDELY CIRCULATED BY THE AGENCY FOR USE AS AMMUNITION BY CRITICS OF THE POLICY INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WITH CONGRESS OR WITH THE PUBLIC.

- OFTEN POLICYMAKERS, FACING A SITUATION OF EXTREME DELICACY WITH ANOTHER COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY WHERE US LAW OR POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES MAY BE INVOLVED, WILL CAUTION US AS WE WRITE OR BRIEF: "NOW, YOU HAVE TO BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT THIS -- LET'S WORK IT OUT TOGETHER BEFOREHAND." AND, WHILE PROTECTING OUR INDEPENDENCE, WE DO TRY TO BE CAREFUL AND WE DO TRY TO TAKE THEIR CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT -- BUT THAT IS LITTLE SOLACE TO A POLICYMAKER WHO IS AT THE POLITICAL MERCY OF ANY CIA BRIEFER WHO GOES TO CAPITOL HILL.

-- MANY POLICYMAKERS BELIEVE CIA ALLOWS ITS BIASES TO DOMINATE ITS REPORTING. WHO WOULD DISAGREE THAT CIA OFFICERS HAVE VIEWS AND BIASES, AND THAT THEY TRY TO PROMOTE THEM? BUT, CIA IS NOT MONOLITHIC; THERE IS A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS INSIDE ON VIRTUALLY EVERY ISSUE. INDEED, THE INTERNAL DEBATES ARE FIERCE AND SOMETIMES BRUTAL -- AFTER ALL, THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH. IT IS NOT A PLACE FOR THE FAINT-HEARTED. WE HAVE ELABORATE PROCEDURES FOR REVIEWING ASSESSMENTS TO TRY TO FILTER OUT INDIVIDUAL BIAS AND MAKE OUR REPORTING AS OBJECTIVE AS POSSIBLE. AND WHEN WE SEND OUT A PROVOCATIVE ANALYSIS BY AN INDIVIDUAL WE TRY ALWAYS TO IDENTIFY IT AS A PERSONAL VIEW.

BEYOND THIS, IS THERE AN INSTITUTIONAL BIAS THAT AFFECTS OUR WORK? PROBABLY, IN SOME AREAS, IN THE BROADEST SENSE, AND PERHAPS BASED ON EXPERIENCE. AS AN INSTITUTION, WE ARE PROBABLY MORE SKEPTICAL OF SOVIET INTENTIONS THAN MOST; MORE CYNICAL ABOUT THE PUBLIC POSTURE OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHEN CONTRASTED TO THEIR ACTIONS, OVERT AND COVERT; MORE DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE EASE AND SPEED WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES CAN USUALLY AFFECT DEVELOPMENTS OVERSEAS; AND, FAIRLY CONSISTENTLY, WE WILL TEND TO SEE PERILS AND DIFFICULTY WHERE OTHERS DO NOT.

SUSPICIONS THAT CIA'S ASSESSMENTS ARE BIASED IN AREAS WHERE CIA IS INVOLVED IN COVERT ACTION FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR REALIZATION THAT OUR WORK IN SUCH AREAS IS SCRUTINIZED WITH SPECIAL CARE BY OTHERS (ESPECIALLY THE CONGRESS) FOR SIGNS OF BIAS. THE ORGANIZATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANALYSIS FROM OPERATIONS IS BUTTRESSED BY INTERNAL AGENCY RIVALRIES.

-- POLICYMAKERS' IMPATIENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE -- WITH CIA -- IS INTENSIFIED BY THE FACT THAT WE ARE SOMETIMES WRONG IN OUR ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS, AND WE OFTEN CHANGE OUR ASSESSMENTS BASED ON NEW ANALYSIS OR NEW INFORMATION. WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE ERROR GRACEFULLY, AND OFTEN DO NOT FOREWARN POLICYMAKERS OF REVISED VIEWS BEFORE THE INFORMATION HITS THE STREET. A POLICYMAKER WHO HAS MADE DECISIONS BASED ON ONE ASSESSMENT ONLY TO SEE IT CHANGE OR TO FIND THAT IT WAS WRONG WILL NOT THINK FONDLY OF US OR SOON WISH AGAIN TO PROCEED ON OUR ASSURANCES OR ASSESSMENTS.

-- AS I SUGGESTED EARLIER, A SPECIAL CRITICISM BY POLICYMAKERS IS THAT CIA IS TOO FREQUENTLY A VOICE OF GLOOM AND DOOM. FOR POLICYMAKERS WHO MUST TRY TO FIND SOLUTIONS FOR INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS OR A WAY OUT OF A NO-WIN SITUATION, OUR FOREBODINGS AND POINTING OUT OF

PERILS AND DANGERS ARE OF LITTLE HELP AND ARE HIGHLY AGGRAVATING.

-- CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS ALSO IS A SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR POLICYMAKERS FOR SEVERAL REASONS, AND IT PROFOUNDLY INFLUENCES OUR ROLE. VIRTUALLY ALL CIA ASSESSMENTS GO TO THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES. MOST GO ALSO TO THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES. IN 1986, CIA SENT SOME 5000 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS AND GAVE MANY HUNDREDS OF BRIEFINGS. ALL THIS IS NEW IN THE LAST DECADE OR SO. AS A RESULT, AND THANKS TO THEIR STAFFS, MANY SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES ARE OFTEN BETTER INFORMED ABOUT CIA'S INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS ON A GIVEN SUBJECT THAN THE POLICYMAKER. AND THAT INTELLIGENCE IS OFTEN USED TO CRITICIZE AND CHALLENGE POLICY, TO SET ONE EXECUTIVE AGENCY AGAINST ANOTHER, AND TO EXPOSE DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN AN ADMINISTRATION.

MOST SPECIALISTS WRITING ABOUT THE CHANGED BALANCE OF POWER IN RECENT YEARS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, CITE WATERGATE AND VIETNAM AS PRIMARY CAUSES. I BELIEVE THERE WAS A THIRD PRINCIPAL FACTOR -- WHEN CONGRESS OBTAINED ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THE MID-1970S ESSENTIALLY EQUAL TO THAT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

- 0 IMAGINE THE REACTION OF THE FORD ADMINISTRATION IN THE MID-70S WHEN THEY WENT TO CONGRESS TO GET ADDITIONAL MONEY FOR CAMBODIA ONLY TO BE CONFRONTED BY THE LEGISLATORS WITH A NEW INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT THAT THE SITUATION WAS HOPELESS.
- 0 IMAGINE PRESIDENT CARTER SEEKING A US TROOP CUT IN SOUTH KOREA ONLY TO FIND CONGRESS AWARE OF A NEW INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE THAT CONCLUDED THE NUMBER OF NORTH KOREAN DIVISIONS HAD GROWN.
- 0 IMAGINE THE REACTION OF A SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SEEKING FUNDS FOR A NEW WEAPON ONLY TO BE TOLD ON THE HILL OF INTELLIGENCE THAT THE SOVIETS COULD NEUTRALIZE THE WEAPON.

THIS SITUATION ADDS EXTRAORDINARY STRESS TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND POLICY AGENCIES. POLICYMAKER SUSPICION OF CIA USING INTELLIGENCE TO SABOTAGE SELECTED ADMINISTRATION POLICIES IS OFTEN NOT FAR BELOW THE SURFACE. AND NOT A FEW MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ARE WILLING TO EXPLOIT THIS SITUATION BY THEIR OWN SELECTIVE USE OF INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTS THEIR VIEWS. THE END RESULT IS TO STRENGTHEN THE

CONGRESSIONAL HAND IN POLICY DEBATES AND TO HEIGHTEN GREATLY THE TENSIONS BETWEEN CIA AND THE REST OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS HAS ALSO GIVEN CONGRESS -- ESPECIALLY THE TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES -- FAR GREATER KNOWLEDGE OF AND INFLUENCE OVER THE WAY CIA AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES SPEND THEIR MONEY THAN ANYONE IN THE EXECUTIVE WOULD DREAM OF EXERCISING: FROM EXPENDITURES IN THE BILLIONS TO LINE ITEMS IN THE THOUSANDS. CONGRESS HAS BEEN IMMENSELY SUPPORTIVE AND STEADFAST IN PROVIDING THE RESOURCES OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS TO REBUILD AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. BUT I SUSPECT IT CAUSES POLICYMAKERS CONSIDERABLE HEARTBURN TO KNOW THAT CONGRESS MAY ACTUALLY HAVE MORE INFLUENCE TODAY OVER OUR PRIORITIES AND HOW WE SPEND OUR MONEY THAN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

THE RESULT OF THESE REALITIES IS THAT CIA TODAY IS IN A REMARKABLE POSITION, POISED NEARLY EQUIDISTANT BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES -- THE FORMER KNOWS THAT CIA IS IN NO POSITION TO WITHHOLD MUCH FROM CONGRESS AND IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO IT, THE CONGRESS HAS ENORMOUS INFLUENCE AND INFORMATION YET REMAINS SUSPICIOUS AND MISTRUSTFUL. THIS MAY BE OR MAY NOT BE HISTORICALLY CHARACTERISTIC OF OTHER EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENTS' RELATIONSHIPS WITH CONGRESS, ALTHOUGH I SUSPECT NOT. REGARDLESS, SUCH A CENTRAL LEGISLATIVE ROLE WITH RESPECT TO AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IS UNIQUE IN OUR HISTORY AND IN THE WORLD. AND OUR POLICYMAKERS KNOW IT.

NOW, LET ME TURN TO CIA'S ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POLICYMAKER AS SEEN FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT.

-- LET ME SAY AT THE OUTSET THAT IN EVERY ADMINISTRATION DURING WHICH I HAVE SERVED THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF SENIOR POLICYMAKERS (ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND ABOVE) WHO WERE AVID USERS AND READERS OF INTELLIGENCE AND WHO AGGRESSIVELY SOUGHT CIA ANALYSIS AND VIEWS. THEY DEDICATED CONSIDERABLE TIME TO TALKING ABOUT SUBSTANTIVE AND POLICY PROBLEMS WITH US. WE HAVE HAD UNPRECEDENTED ACCESS IN THIS ADMINISTRATION FROM THE PRESIDENT ON DOWN, ESPECIALLY FOR ANALYSIS, AND DAILY CONTACT WITH THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE. THEY HAVE OFTEN DIRECTLY TASKED US AND OFFERED REACTIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE THEY READ -- AND THEY HAVE READ A GREAT DEAL. THIS IS TRUE ALSO OF THEIR SENIOR SUBORDINATES, WITH WHOM WE ARE IN CONSTANT CONTACT. THIS HAS CONTRIBUTED ENORMOUSLY TO IMPROVING THE RELEVANCE,

TIMING, AND SUBSTANCE OF OUR ANALYSIS AND OTHER SUPPORT. IT IS A DYNAMIC, HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP, EVEN THOUGH IT IS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON CURRENT ISSUES.

-- THIS PREOCCUPATION WITH CURRENT REPORTING IS, FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, A MAJOR PROBLEM. IF, AS I HAVE BEEN TOLD, THE AVERAGE TENURE OF AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN GOVERNMENT IS 21 MONTHS, A SHORT TERM FOCUS IS UNDERSTANDABLE BUT LAMENTABLE, AND, ULTIMATELY, VERY COSTLY TO OUR COUNTRY. ONE OF OUR GREATEST CONCERNS OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN THE UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY OF MOST POLICYMAKERS TO SPEND MUCH TIME ON LONGER RANGE ISSUES -- LOOKING AHEAD SEVERAL STEPS -- OR IN HELPING TO GUIDE OR DIRECT OUR EFFORTS. FOR MANY YEARS WE HAVE STRUGGLED, LARGELY IN VAIN, TO GET POLICY OFFICIALS TO DEVOTE TIME TO NON-CRISIS RELATED INTELLIGENCE ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, WE WORK HARD TO DETERMINE THEIR REQUIREMENTS -- WHAT ARE THEIR PRIORITIES, WHAT ISSUES OR PROBLEMS SHOULD WE ADDRESS, HOW CAN WE HELP? ONE REASON CONGRESS HAS ASSUMED A LARGER ROLE IN THESE AREAS, IN MY VIEW, IS BECAUSE POLICYMAKERS IN SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE LARGELY ABDICATED THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. FOR MANY YEARS, TRYING TO GET SENIOR POLICY PRINCIPALS TO MEETINGS TO DISCUSS LONGER RANGE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS HAS BEEN AN EXERCISE IN FRUSTRATION. BEYOND THE LACK OF HELP ON REQUIREMENTS,

WE GET LITTLE FEEDBACK ON OUR LONGER RANGE WORK TO HELP US BE MORE RESPONSIVE. WE HAVE BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE IN RECENT YEARS IN TRYING TO ENGAGE POLICYMAKERS ON THESE MATTERS, AND KEY FIGURES IN THIS ADMINISTRATION HAVE SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN SELECTED LONG RANGE PROBLEMS, BUT SUCH INTEREST REMAINS EXCEEDINGLY, DANGEROUSLY RARE.

-- IN PART BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT TIME SPENT ON INTELLIGENCE, TOO MANY POLICYMAKERS EARLY ON HAVE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DO THAT, WHEN DISAPPOINTED, TURN TO SKEPTICISM WHETHER WE CAN DO ANYTHING.

-- IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE OVER THE YEARS THAT THE POLICYMAKERS' RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE THEY DISAGREE WITH OR FIND UNPALATABLE MOST OFTEN IS TO IGNORE IT; SOMETIMES, THEY WILL CHARACTERIZE IT AS INCOMPLETE, TOO NARROWLY FOCUSED OR AS INCOMPETENT (AND THEY ARE SOMETIMES RIGHT); AND OCCASIONALLY THEY WILL CHARGE THAT IT IS "COOKED" OR THAT IT REFLECTS A CIA BIAS. IN 21 YEARS IN INTELLIGENCE, I HAVE NEVER HEARD A POLICYMAKER (OR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT MATTER) CHARACTERIZE AS BIASED OR COOKED A CIA ASSESSMENT WITH WHICH HE AGREED. ON VIETNAM, VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY AND BEHAVIOR, ANGOLA, LEBANON, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMBARGOES OR SANCTIONS, AND OTHER ISSUES OVER THE

YEARS, OUR ANALYSTS HAVE DRAWN CONCLUSIONS THAT DASH COLD WATER ON THE HOPES AND EFFORTS OF THE POLICYMAKERS. SOMETIMES WE HAVE BEEN WRONG, BUT ON PROBLEMS LARGE AND SMALL WE HAVE NOT FLINCHED FROM PRESENTING OUR HONEST VIEW.

THERE IS NO CHARGE TO WHICH WE IN CIA ARE MORE SENSITIVE THAN THAT OF "COOKING" INTELLIGENCE -- OF SLANTING OUR REPORTING TO SUPPORT POLICY. EVERY DIRECTOR SINCE I JOINED CIA HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF THIS AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, I BELIEVE IN VIRTUALLY ALL INSTANCES UNFAIRLY. FIRST, ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL VIEWS. NATIONAL ESTIMATES ARE REVIEWED AND COORDINATED BY A DOZEN AGENCIES; CIA ASSESSMENTS ARE WIDELY REVIEWED INSIDE THE AGENCY BUT ALMOST NEVER EVEN SEEN BY THE DIRECTOR BEFORE BEING PUBLISHED AND CIRCULATED. AS NOTED EARLIER, ALL GO TO SEVERAL COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS, WHERE THEY ARE SCRUTINIZED.

THESE FORMAL ASSESSMENTS MUST BE DISTINGUISHED FROM PERSONAL VIEWS EXPRESSED BY INDIVIDUALS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE AGENCY, FROM ANALYST TO SENIOR OPERATIONS OFFICER TO DIRECTOR. MORE THAN ONCE, DCI CASEY (AND PROBABLY HIS PREDECESSORS) APPROVED AN ESTIMATE WITH WHICH HE DISAGREED PERSONALLY, AND SEPARATELY CONVEYED

HIS PERSONAL VIEW TO POLICYMAKERS. LEST THIS RAISE EYEBROWS, I REMIND YOU THAT IN 1962 DCI MCCONE DISAGREED WITH THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON WHETHER THE SOVIETS MIGHT INSTALL MISSILES IN CUBA. HE TOLD PRESIDENT KENNEDY THEY WOULD, AND HE ALONE IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WAS RIGHT. AND, I SHOULD ADD, I AM TOLD, THIS COST HIM HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT. AS LONG AS ALL POINTS OF VIEW ARE FAIRLY REPRESENTED AND REPORTED, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -- THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF INTELLIGENCE ADVISER -- IS ENTITLED (EVEN OBLIGATED) TO HAVE AND TO PUT FORWARD HIS OWN VIEW. AS PROFESSOR HENRY ROWEN OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY RECENTLY WROTE IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, "... A CIA DIRECTOR IS NOT SUPPOSED TO BE AN INTELLECTUAL EUNUCH."

POLICYMAKERS HAVE ALWAYS LIKED INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTED WHAT THEY WANT TO DO, AND THEY OFTEN TRY TO INFLUENCE THE ANALYSIS TO COME TO CONCLUSIONS THEY WANT. THEY ASK CAREFULLY PHRASED QUESTIONS; THEY SOMETIMES WITHHOLD INFORMATION; THEY BROADEN OR NARROW THE ISSUE; ON RARE OCCASIONS, THEY EVEN TRY TO INTIMIDATE. THE PRESSURES CAN BE ENORMOUS. THIS IS WHERE THE INTEGRITY OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, BOLSTERED BY A NATURAL TENDENCY TO RESIST PRESSURE AND AN OFTEN ADVERSARIAL BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIP, COMES INTO PLAY TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ASSESSMENT.

BUT, OVERALL, YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE GIVE AND TAKE -- THE DIALOGUE -- BETWEEN POLICYMAKER AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON ISSUES IS NORMAL, HEALTHY, AND USUALLY IMPROVES OUR ASSESSMENTS AND MAKES THEM MORE USEFUL TO THE POLICYMAKER -- EVEN WHILE OBJECTIVITY IS PRESERVED. WE KNOW THEY ARE OFTEN TRYING TO INFLUENCE AN ASSESSMENT, BUT THAT DOES NOT RENDER THEIR INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS IRRELEVANT OR OFF-LIMITS.

A FINAL THOUGHT. TO ATTEMPT TO SLANT INTELLIGENCE NOT ONLY TRANGRESSES THE DEEPEST ETHICAL AND CULTURAL PRINCIPLE OF CIA, WE ALL KNOW IT WOULD ALSO BE FOOLISH -- IT WOULD PRESUPPOSE A SINGLE POINT OF VIEW IN AN ADMINISTRATION AND WOULD IGNORE THE REALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL READERSHIP. INDEED, IN MY OPINION, THE SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH CONGRESS IS ONE OF THE SUREST GUARANTEES OF CIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY. AS DIRECTOR WEBSTER HAS SAID, "WE INTEND TO 'TELL IT AS IT IS,' AVOIDING BIAS AS MUCH AS WE CAN, OR THE POLITICIZATION OF OUR PRODUCT. POLICYMAKERS MAY NOT LIKE THE MESSAGE THEY HEAR FROM US, ESPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW. MY POSITION IS THAT IN THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WE WILL PROVIDE THEM FOR THE USE OF POLICYMAKERS. THEY

CAN BE USED IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THEY CAN BE IGNORED,
OR TORN UP, OR THROWN AWAY, BUT THEY MAY NOT BE
CHANGED."

CONCLUSION

WHAT I HAVE DESCRIBED HERE IS THE REALITY OF CIA'S ROLE IN
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. I HAVE TRIED TO GO
BEYOND THE MECHANICS AND THE HEADLINES TO IDENTIFY THE
STRESSES, TENSIONS, RIVALRIES, ENDURING COMPLAINTS AND
RELATIONSHIPS -- THE PULLING AND HAULING, DAY IN AND DAY OUT,
REAL LIFE IF YOU WILL -- THAT DETERMINE CIA'S ROLE AND ITS
IMPACT. SOME OF OUR ANALYSES ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS; SOME
INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS; ESTIMATES
SOMETIMES ALLEGED TO BE POLITICIZED OR BIASED WERE NOT THAT AT
ALL -- SOMETIMES THEY WERE JUST NOT VERY WELL DONE. BUT
UNEVENNESS OF QUALITY SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH
POLITICIZATION.

CIA'S AUTONOMY IS UNIQUE IN OUR GOVERNMENT, ITS
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGISLATURE IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. OUR
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE ARE A
DYNAMIC BLEND OF SUPPORT AND RIVALRY, OF COOPERATION AND
CONFLICT. OUR CHALLENGE IS TO MANAGE THOSE RELATIONSHIPS SO


THAT THE WHOLE RANGE OF INTERACTIONS -- SUPPORTIVE AND ADVERSARIAL -- NET OUT TO PROMOTE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF AN EVER MORE COMPLEX WORLD AROUND US AND HENCE CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER INFORMED DECISIONS AND POLICIES.

THE REAL INTELLIGENCE STORY IN RECENT YEARS IS THE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT, WITH HELP FROM BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, IN THE QUALITY, RELEVANCE AND TIMELINESS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE POLICYMAKER -- A STORY THAT HAS BEEN NEGLECTED IN PREFERENCE TO CONTROVERSIAL COVERT ACTIONS, PROBLEMS BETWEEN CIA AND THE CONGRESS, AND SPY SCANDALS. WE UNDERSTAND THIS POLITICAL REALITY, BUT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT AMERICANS KNOW THAT OUR PRIMARY MISSION REMAINS THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. THIS IS OUR PRIMARY ROLE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. AS RANELAGH OBSERVES, "... SO FAR FROM BEING THE SECRET POLICE THAT TRUMAN AND MANY THOUGHTFUL PEOPLE HAD FEARED ONLY HALF A LIFETIME EARLIER, THE CIA [IS] NOW TAKEN FOR GRANTED AS A MODERATE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARM OF THE AMERICAN STATE." THE PRESIDENT, THE POLICY COMMUNITY, AND THE CONGRESS -- ALBEIT SOMETIMES WITH CLENCHED TEETH -- DEPEND UPON US, TASK US, AND LOOK TO US MORE EACH DAY. WE ATTRACT AMERICA'S BRIGHTEST YOUNG PEOPLE, WHO FIND WITH CIA EXCEPTIONALLY CHALLENGING, HONORABLE, AND CONSISTENTLY FASCINATING CAREERS. TO QUOTE RANELAGH A FINAL TIME, IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF HIS BOOK, HE STATES, "IN ITS MOMENTS OF ACHIEVEMENT AS WELL AS CONDEMNATION, THE AGENCY WAS A REMINDER

THAT IT WAS A FAITHFUL INSTRUMENT OF THE MOST DECENT AND
PERHAPS THE SIMPLEST OF THE GREAT POWERS, AND CERTAINLY THE ONE
THAT EVEN IN ITS DARKEST PASSAGES PRACTICED MOST CONSISTENTLY
THE VIRTUE OF HOPE."

THE UNITED STATES HAS THE FINEST GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE IN THE WORLD. FAITHFUL TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
LAWS, IT HELPS TO SAFEGUARD OUR FREEDOM AGAINST OUR ADVERSARIES
AND HELPS THE POLICYMAKER UNDERSTAND AND DEAL WITH THE OFTEN
DANGEROUS WORLD AROUND US. CIA IS TRULY AMERICA'S FIRST LINE
OF DEFENSE -- ITS EYES AND EARS. AND OUR DEEPEST COMMITMENT,
TO BORROW A PHRASE USED BY ERIC LARRABEE TO DESCRIBE GEORGE
MARSHALL, IS "TO SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER."

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505



2 September 1987

Admiral B.R. Inman, USN (Ret.)



STAT

Dear Bob:

I have been asked to give a public speech at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton at the end of the month. After Shultz' testimony and some of the things that have been in the newspapers, I decided to speak to the role of CIA and foreign policy and in particular the dynamics of the relationship between intelligence and the policymaker. I enclose a rough, early draft of the speech. I would welcome any comments or suggestions you might have.

Looking forward to seeing you soon.

Regards,



Robert M. Gates

STAT

Enclosure:
As Stated




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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505



2 September 1987

Mr. John McMahon




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


Robert M. Gates

STAT

Enclosure:
As Stated

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505



2 September 1987

Mr. Eli Jacobs




STAT

Dear Eli:

Enclosed is a draft copy of my Princeton speech. It is still pretty rough. I would be interested in any thoughts or suggestions you might have.

I also enclose the unexpurgated version of Bob Tyrrell's column on Casey's books. I think you will find it of interest.




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Many thanks for your hospitality on Tuesday. It is always a great pleasure to talk with you. I enjoyed our conversations with



STAT

Warm regards,



STAT

Robert M. Gates

Enclosures:
As Stated

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King Features Syndicate - R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr. - 12 May 1987

New York--What will become of Bill Casey's books? At his mansion here on Long Island friends filed past his coffin and then into the enormous rooms lined with thousands of books stacked to the ceilings, perhaps fifteen feet up. Casey lived in a library adorned with the mementoes and laurels that betoken the life of a great public man. But this former Director of Central Intelligence, who died May 6, was like no other public man today. In a remote corner of his enclosed porch looking out on Long Island Sound stands a card catalogue made of wood and equal to those that might be found in a county library. Bill Casey was one of the best read men in modern American government. He was gruff and blunt, but he had an exquisite mind illuminated and ennobled by these walls of philosophy, literature, history, finance, economics, and more. Now there will be books about him. He was a great man.

Crossing Paris' Pont Neuf several years ago, one of Britain's finest journalists, Frank Johnson, asked me why no American statesmen today could match the sagacity and character of the magnificent generation that guided us through World War II. I told him we had one left, the man who had directed Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign, stocked the Reagan Administration with most of its best young talent, rebuilt the CIA, and sustained some of the administration's soundest policies, Bill Casey. Like a Churchill or a DeGaulle, Casey had saved his greatest feats for late in life. His long career of public service extended from the confident premises and supreme deeds of World War II to our own days of mediocrity and uncertainty.

Casey recognized the deterioration. He knew that by answering Ronald Reagan's call all the esteem that had accrued from a long and honorable life was being placed at risk. He would not have been surprised that at his funeral mass in the presence of his grieving friends and family an obtuse Catholic prelate would rebuke him for adhering to the same values that saved the West from Nazism in the 1940s and have thwarted Communism ever since. The bishop had deluded himself into believing that he was serving his Christian duty, though his ethics might astonish a pagan. Over the expressed wishes of the Casey family he had invited himself to speak!

Casey's was "the greatest US intelligence career," according to William Safire, and generations of spooks from here and abroad paid Casey their respects. But dozens of other professions were represented too. The scope of Casey's interests was as vast as his library.

During World War II William Donovan, head of our fledgling intelligence service, spotted Casey's mix of strategic and tactical acumen and made him a global trouble shooter. The two understood that in the struggle against aggressive totalitarianism wars would henceforth be fought without battlefields or even declarations of war. The combatants would attempt to penetrate populations with agents of influence, disinformation, psychological manipulation and other forms of subversion.

After the war Casey made a fortune as a lawyer and venture capitalist. Then his zest for action lured him to politics, not to the campaigns of idiot jingles and blow-dried beauty but to the serious stuff. Suggestive of his depth was his life-long participation in

refugee relief. There are never many votes in that sort of work. Nor was there easy applause for aiding anti-Communists in Afghanistan, Africa, and Central America. Yet Casey persevered to protect American freedom and to assure that in the years to come there would be fewer refugees. He has been criticized for poor relations with Congress, which is a disingenuous way of saying that he would not capitulate to legislative usurpation of foreign policy and to inferior minds. He defended the interests of the Western democracies today as he did in World War II. It is a fight that liberals and conservatives once shared.

With the rolling gait and cocky demeanor of a man half his age he became Ronald Reagan's wisest advisor. Since cancer of the brain felled him in December, those who cannot face the totalitarian challenge have charged him with low deeds and violating the law in directing aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. Casey was too bright a lawyer to break the law, even such a platypus of a law as the Boland Amendment. Just before he entered the hospital, we met in a crowded room. "I'm as clean as a hound's tooth," he growled. I wish he would growl at me just one more time. I didn't know the great man was dying.

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr. is editor-in-chief of The American Spectator.

PRINCETON/SEPT87/3SEPT

CIA AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

I HAVE CHOSEN TO SPEAK THIS EVENING ON THE ROLE OF CIA IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. DESPITE A GROWING AND MOSTLY RESPECTABLE ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON INTELLIGENCE, PUBLIC VIEWS OF CIA HAVE BEEN SHAPED PRIMARILY BY MOVIES, TELEVISION, NOVELS, NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS OR ALLEGATIONS OF MISDEEDS, HEADLINES GROWING OUT OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES, GRANDSTANDING PUBLIC FIGURES, EXPOSES BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AND ESSAYS BY EXPERTS WHO HAVE NEVER SERVED IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND BY SOME WHO HAVE SERVED AND STILL NEVER UNDERSTOOD OUR ROLE. WE ARE SAID TO BE AN INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT AND YET ARE THE MOST VISIBLE, MOST EXTERNALLY SUPERVISED AND MOST WRITTEN ABOUT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD. WHILE WE CAN SOMETIMES PUBLICLY REFUTE FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZATION, MALFEASANCE AND INCOMPETENCE, USUALLY WE MUST REMAIN SILENT. WE HAVE NEITHER THE RESOURCES NOR THE INCLINATION TO ANSWER ALL THE CRITICISMS AND ALLEGATIONS AGAINST US.

THE RESULT IS A CONTRADICTORY MELANGE OF PUBLIC IMAGES OF CIA AND VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR REAL ROLE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

TONIGHT, I WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO SHED SOME LIGHT ON AND I HOPE EXPAND UNDERSTANDING OF CIA'S ROLE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

THIS ROLE TAKES THREE BROAD FORMS:

- FIRST, THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO POLICYMAKERS, PRINCIPALLY THE PRESIDENT AND HIS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE -- ALTHOUGH IN RECENT YEARS TREASURY, COMMERCE AND MANY OTHERS HAVE BECOME MAJOR USERS OF INTELLIGENCE.
- SECOND, THE INTERACTION, MAINLY IN WASHINGTON, BETWEEN CIA AND THE POLICY COMMUNITY IT IS IN THE DYNAMICS OF THIS RELATIONSHIP THAT THE INFLUENCE AND ROLE OF CIA ARE DETERMINED -- WHETHER CIA'S ASSESSMENTS ARE HEEDDED OR NOT, WHETHER CIA'S INFORMATION IS RELEVANT AND TIMELY ENOUGH TO BE USEFUL, AND WHETHER CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICYMAKERS FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE, PROBLEM TO PROBLEM, IS SUPPORTIVE OR ADVERSARIAL. IT IS IN THE DYNAMICS OF THESE RELATIONSHIPS THAT THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE IS DETERMINED.

-- THIRD, CIA'S ROLE IS MANIFESTED IN COVERT ACTION, THE ONE AREA WHERE WE ARE ASSIGNED THE ROLE OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION.

THE FIRST OF THESE, COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, IS A FAIRLY WELL KNOWN AREA, AND I WILL SPEAK TO IT ONLY SUMMARILY. THE LAST, COVERT ACTION, IS ALL TOO FAMILIAR, AND I SEE NO NEED HERE TO EXPAND UPON WHAT YOU HAVE READ AND SEEN. IT IS THE SECOND, THE DYNAMIC INTERACTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY, THAT IS LEAST WELL UNDERSTOOD AND IT IS THIS AREA I WILL FOCUS UPON TONIGHT. AND, WHILE IN MOST CASES POLICY BUILDS ON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (RATHER THAN VICE VERSA), AND THE RELATIONSHIPS ARE POSITIVE AND PRODUCTIVE, I WANT TO SPEAK ABOUT THE AREAS OF CONFLICT AND COMPLAINT, FOR THEY ARE THE SOURCE OF GREATEST INTEREST AND CONTROVERSY.

COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

LET ME START WITH A FEW FACTS TO GIVE YOU PERSPECTIVE. GIVEN THE MEDIA'S ATTENTION TO COVERT ACTION, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT OVER 90 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BUDGET IS DEVOTED TO THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION, ALONG WITH REQUIRED ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. LESS THAN ONE PERCENT OF CIA'S PEOPLE WORK ON COVERT ACTION.

NOW, IF CIA IS NOT SPENDING MOST OF ITS TIME OR MONEY TRYING TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENTS, WHAT EXACTLY DOES IT DO? IT DEVOTES THE OVERWHELMING PREPONDERANCE OF ITS EFFORT AND MONEY COLLECTING AND ANALYZING INFORMATION -- INFORMATION FROM SATELLITES; NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS, RADIOS, AND TELEVISION AROUND THE WORLD; DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY ATTACHES OVERSEAS; AND, OF COURSE, FROM CLASSIC SPIES. THAT INFORMATION FLOWS TO WASHINGTON WHERE THOUSANDS OF ANALYSTS SIFT THROUGH IT, EXAMINE IT, COLLATE IT, TRY TO MAKE SENSE OF THE BILLIONS OF BITS AND PIECES THAT COME TO US ON THE NEARLY INFINITE NUMBER OF ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS WORLD-WIDE OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. WE THEN REPORT OUR FINDINGS TO POLICY OFFICIALS AND MILITARY COMMANDERS.

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND HOW IS IT USED BY THE POLICYMAKER? THE KEY IS RELEVANCE TO US POLICY AND US INTERESTS. IT IS THE COMPREHENSIVENESS OF OUR COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, THEIR FOCUS ON US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, AND THE ADVANTAGE OF UNIQUE OR PRIOR KNOWLEDGE, THAT MAKE INTELLIGENCE VALUABLE TO THE POLICYMAKER.

INFORMATION ON THE FULL RANGE OF SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS, THE REAL PROGRESS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION, THE POLICIES AND ATTITUDES OF KEY LEADERS AND NEW GOVERNMENTS, THE STABILITY OF KEY GOVERNMENTS AND

COUNTRIES, TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND PLANS, TRENDS IN GLOBAL OIL AND FOOD PRODUCTION, THE PLANS OF DEBTOR NATIONS TO SUSPEND PAYMENTS OR CHALLENGE CREDITORS, AND COUNTLESS OTHER SUBJECTS IS KEY TO THE FORMULATION OF EFFECTIVE US POLICIES.

THIS INFORMATION FINDS ITS WAY TO THE POLICYMAKER IN MANY WAYS:

- FIRST, INTELLIGENCE ON DAY TO DAY EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD IS PROVIDED TO SENIOR OFFICIALS DAILY OR EVEN MORE FREQUENTLY.
- SECOND, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTES ANALYSIS TO POLICY PAPERS DESCRIBING BOTH EVENTS AT HAND AND POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES OR PROBLEMS FOR THE UNITED STATES. NEARLY ALL NSC AND SUB-CABINET MEETINGS BEGIN WITH AN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING.
- THIRD, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MAKING OF POLICY. THESE ESTIMATES ARE THE MOST FORMAL EXPRESSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY VIEWS AND ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTE TO AND COORDINATE ON WHAT IS SAID IN THESE ESTIMATES.

THE VALUE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ESTIMATES VARIES. SOME THAT HAVE THE MOST IMPACT, LIKE THE MILITARY ESTIMATES, RECEIVE MODEST ATTENTION AT THE TOP LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. THOSE ON PROBLEMS THAT ARE IMPORTANT BUT ON WHICH FEW POLICYMAKERS ARE EXPERT -- LIKE THE PERSIAN GULF, CAMBODIA, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRADE OR THE POLITICAL AND HUMAN IMPLICATIONS OF THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AFRICA -- ARE READ CLOSELY, AS ARE THOSE ON CERTAIN ECONOMIC ISSUES. SOME ESTIMATES, SUCH AS THE ONE ON MEXICO, GET ATTENTION BECAUSE THEY ARE PROVOCATIVE; OTHERS, SUCH AS NICARAGUA, BECAUSE THE SUBJECT ITSELF IS CONTROVERSIAL.

-- FOURTH, POLICYMAKERS RECEIVE SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES. CIA'S ASSESSMENTS OR RESEARCH PROGRAM IS THE PRODUCT OF THE LARGEST INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATION IN THE WORLD. THE RANGE OF ISSUES IS BREATHTAKING -- FROM STRATEGIC WEAPONS TO FOOD SUPPLIES; EPIDEMIOLOGY TO SPACE; WATER AND CLIMATE TO THIRD WORLD POLITICAL INSTABILITY; MINERAL RESOURCES TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCE; SUPPLIES OF ENERGY AND OIL TO FORCED LABOR CAMPS; SOVIET LASER WEAPONS TO REMOTE TRIBAL DEMOGRAPHICS; CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION TO COMMODITY SUPPLIES; AND MANY, MANY MORE.

CIA-POLICY RELATIONSHIPS

SO FAR, SO GOOD. WHAT I HAVE JUST REVIEWED IS A TEXTBOOK DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE. NEAT, UNAMBIGUOUS, CLINICAL, NON-CONTROVERSIAL, EVEN COMMENDABLE -- AND HIGHLY MISLEADING. WHAT ABOUT USERS WHO LOOK NOT FOR DATA OR UNDERSTANDING, BUT FOR SUPPORT FOR DECISIONS ALREADY MADE; OR USERS WHO LABEL INTELLIGENCE THEY DISLIKE AS TOO SOFT OR TOO HARD OR COOKED; OR SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WITH THEIR OWN AGENDA; OR BIASED ANALYSTS; OR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WHO CLAIM A CERTITUDE ABOUT THE FUTURE UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE OR HISTORY; OR IMPERFECT COLLECTION SET AGAINST UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS; OR THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY OF A CIA DIRECTOR HELD AT TOO GREAT A DISTANCE OR ONE HELD TOO CLOSE; OR THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CONSTANTLY CHANGING EVALUATIONS, OR ANALYSIS THAT IS JUST PLAIN WRONG; OR THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE AS A POLITICAL FOOTBALL BETWEEN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS OR BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES. THE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR OF OFFICIALS IN CIA AND POLICY AGENCIES THAT LIE BEHIND THESE AND MANY SIMILAR ISSUES AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THEM TOGETHER COMPRISE THE DYNAMIC OF THE RELATIONSHIP AND CIA'S ROLE -- WHAT PROFESSOR YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI OF HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM CALLS "THE INTELLIGENCE-POLICYMAKER TANGLE."

IN 1949, SHERMAN KENT, IN HIS BOOK STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICAN WORLD POLICY, SAID "THERE IS NO PHASE OF THE INTELLIGENCE BUSINESS WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE ITSELF AND THE PEOPLE WHO USE ITS PRODUCT. ODDLY ENOUGH, THIS RELATIONSHIP, WHICH ONE WOULD EXPECT TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AUTOMATICALLY, DOES NOT DO THIS."

THE FACT IS THAT, OVER THE YEARS, THE POLICYMAKER AND THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER HAVE CONSISTENTLY -- AND WITH FRIGHTENINGLY FEW EXCEPTIONS -- COME TOGETHER HUGELY IGNORANT OF THE REALITIES AND COMPLEXITIES OF EACH OTHER'S WORLD -- PROCESS, TECHNIQUE, FORM AND CULTURE. CIA OFFICERS CAN TELL YOU IN EXCRUCIATING DETAIL HOW FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE IN EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD SAVE ONE -- THE UNITED STATES. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS SUGGESTED BY PROFESSOR HARKABI, THE UNHAPPINESS OF INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE SWELLS "WHEN THEY COMPARE THE SOPHISTICATION AND ADVANCED METHODS EMPLOYED IN COLLECTION OF THE INFORMATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE CAVALIER FASHION OR IMPROVISATION WITH WHICH POLICY DECISIONS ARE MANY A TIME REACHED." BOOKSHELVES GROAN UNDER THE LITERATURE OF PROPOSED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WHEN THESE TWO WORLDS COLLIDE. IN 1956, FOR EXAMPLE, ROGER HILSMAN SAID INTELLIGENCE PRODUCERS MUST "ORIENT THEMSELVES FRANKLY AND CONSCIOUSLY TOWARD POLICY AND ACTION ... ADAPTING TOOLS EXPRESSLY TO THE NEEDS OF POLICY." OTHERS, AS DESCRIBED IN ONE

INTELLIGENCE MONOGRAPH, ARGUED THAT "THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCER SHOULD INITIATE NO DIRECT INTERACTION WITH HIS CONSUMERS, BUT RATHER SHOULD RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR DATA AND ANALYSIS."

SHERMAN KENT WAS PERHAPS THE FIRST OF THE EARLY INTELLIGENCE COMMENTATORS TO SEE THE NEED FOR A DIFFERENT, MORE DIRECT AND INTENSIVE INTERACTION BETWEEN POLICYMAKER AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. WARNING THAT PROTECTING THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYST COULD BE LIKENED TO PILING ARMOR ON A MEDIEVAL KNIGHT UNTIL HE WAS ABSOLUTELY SAFE BUT COMPLETELY USELESS, KENT CONCLUDED THAT THE GREATER DANGER TO AN EFFECTIVE ROLE WAS IN BEING TOO DISTANT. EVEN SO, HE FORESAW A TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP -- THAT ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERNS WOULD INCREASE INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA; THAT INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS' SKEPTICISM OF POLICYMAKERS' OBJECTIVITY -- AND THE LATTER'S CONSEQUENT RESENTMENT -- WOULD STULTIFY A FREE GIVE AND TAKE BETWEEN THEM; THAT POLICYMAKERS WOULD SEE THE VERY FACT OF CIA ASSESSMENTS AS AN INSULT TO THEIR OWN INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITIES; THAT SECURITY CONCERNS BY EACH PARTY WOULD ENCOURAGE WARINESS AND RETICENCE. AND, IN TRUTH, THESE AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES, STILL LARGELY SHAPE CIA'S ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS.

LET ME ELABORATE ON THESE DIFFICULTIES BASED ON PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN BOTH WORLDS AT DIFFERENT TIMES UNDER FIVE PRESIDENTS. SET ASIDE TEXTBOOK AND MONOGRAPH AND LET ME SHARE REALITY WITH YOU.

THE INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE -- OF CIA -- IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. WHILE THIS CONFERS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES, ABOVE ALL INDEPENDENCE, SUCH AUTONOMY ALSO IMBUES THE CIA-POLICY COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP WITH A SIGNIFICANT ADVERSARIAL AS WELL AS SUPPORTIVE CONTENT. AND, THE POLICYMAKER HAS A LONG LIST OF GRIEVANCES, SOME LEGITIMATE, SOME NOT.

-- THEY LEGITIMATELY WANT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT WILL INFORM AND GUIDE THEIR TACTICAL DAY TO DAY DECISIONMAKING. IN SOME AREAS, WE CAN AND DO MEET THEIR NEEDS. IN 1980, THANKS TO A VERY BRAVE MAN, WE WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE STEP BY STEP PREPARATIONS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. IN EARLY 1986, WE WERE ABLE TO DOCUMENT IN EXTRAORDINARY DETAIL ELECTORAL CHEATING IN THE PHILIPPINES. THERE ARE SOME AREAS WHERE OUR INTELLIGENCE IS SO GOOD THAT IT REDUCES POLICYMAKERS FLEXIBILITY AND ROOM FOR MANEUVER. YET, WE WOULD HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE COUNTRIES AND ISSUES IMPORTANT TO THE US WHERE SUCH TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE -- MOST OFTEN POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE -- IS SORELY DEFICIENT AND POLICYMAKER COMPLAINTS ARE JUSTIFIED. OUR CAPABILITIES ARE MUCH IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS, BUT STILL UNEVEN. AND NO MATTER HOW GOOD WE ARE, THERE

WILL OCCASIONALLY STILL BE SURPRISES OR GAPS. WE ARE NOT, AND CANNOT BE, OMNISCIENT. THAT IS A QUALITY RESERVED TO A HIGHER KIND OF INTELLIGENCE.

-- IT WILL NOT SURPRISE YOU THAT POLICYMAKERS DO NOT LIKE CIA INFORMATION WHICH DIRECTLY OR BY INFERENCE CHALLENGES THE SUCCESS OR ADEQUACY OF THEIR POLICIES OR PROGRAMS. WHETHER ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL QUALITY OF SOVIET WEAPONS, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE INTENTIONS OF OTHERS, DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON OR ANGOLA, OR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMBARGOES OR SANCTIONS. I HAVE YET TO SEE A POLICYMAKER WELCOME A VIEW THAT CHALLENGES HIS DECISIONS, POLICIES OR PROGRAMS. AND, YET, I ALSO CONCEDE THAT ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION, POLICYMAKERS HAVE READ A SITUATION BETTER THAN WE. IN ANY EVENT, RIGHT OR WRONG, CIA INFORMATION THAT DIRECTLY OR EVEN INFERENTIALLY CHALLENGES POLICY DOES NOT ENHANCE OUR WELCOME.

-- IN THIS CONNECTION, THE POLICYMAKER OFTEN HAS THE SENSE THAT CIA IS ATTEMPTING, AT LEAST BY IMPLICATION, TO "GRADE" HIS PERFORMANCE AND THEN DISPROPORTIONATELY TO REPORT DEFICIENCIES TO A WIDE AUDIENCE -- WHO WILL THEN USE THAT VERY INTELLIGENCE AS AMMUNITION TO ATTACK HIM INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WITH CONGRESS, OR PUBLICLY.

- OFTEN POLICYMAKERS, FACING A SITUATION OF EXTREME DELICACY WITH ANOTHER COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY WHERE US LAW OR POLITICAL SENSIBILITIES MAY BE INVOLVED, WILL CAUTION US AS WE WRITE OR BRIEF: "NOW, YOU HAVE TO BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT THIS -- LET'S WORK IT OUT TOGETHER BEFOREHAND." AND WE DO TRY TO BE CAREFUL AND WE DO TRY TO TAKE THEIR CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT -- BUT THAT IS LITTLE SOLACE TO A POLICYMAKER WHO IS AT THE POLITICAL MERCY OF ANY CIA BRIEFER WHO GOES TO CAPITOL HILL.

- MANY POLICYMAKERS BELIEVE CIA ALLOWS ITS BIASES TO DOMINATE ITS REPORTING. I WOULD NOTE THAT THIS CHARGE IS MADE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY WHEN THE POLICYMAKER DISAGREES WITH THAT REPORTING. WHO WOULD DISAGREE THAT CIA OFFICERS HAVE VIEWS AND BIASES, AND THAT THEY TRY TO PROMOTE THEM? BUT, CIA IS NOT MONOLITHIC; THERE IS A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS INSIDE ON VIRTUALLY EVERY ISSUE. WE HAVE ELABORATE PROCEDURES FOR A NUMBER OF PEOPLE TO REVIEW ASSESSMENTS TO TRY TO FILTER OUT INDIVIDUAL BIAS AND MAKE OUR REPORTING AS OBJECTIVE AS POSSIBLE. AND WHEN WE SEND OUT A PROVOCATIVE ANALYSIS BY AN INDIVIDUAL WE TRY ALWAYS TO IDENTIFY IT AS A PERSONAL VIEW.

BEYOND THIS, IS THERE AN INSTITUTIONAL BIAS THAT AFFECTS OUR WORK? PROBABLY, IN SOME AREAS, IN THE BROADEST SENSE, AND PERHAPS BASED ON EXPERIENCE. AS AN INSTITUTION, WE ARE PROBABLY MORE SKEPTICAL OF SOVIET INTENTIONS THAN MOST; MORE CYNICAL ABOUT THE PUBLIC POSTURE OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHEN CONTRASTED TO THEIR ACTIONS, OVERT AND COVERT; MORE DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE EASE AND SPEED WITH WHICH THE US CAN USUALLY AFFECT DEVELOPMENTS OVERSEAS; AND, FAIRLY CONSISTENTLY, WE WILL TEND TO SEE PERILS AND DIFFICULTY WHERE OTHERS DO NOT.

FINALLY, SUSPICIONS THAT CIA'S ASSESSMENTS ARE BIASED IN AREAS WHERE CIA IS INVOLVED IN COVERT ACTION FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR REALIZATION THAT OUR WORK IN SUCH AREAS WILL BE SCRUTINIZED WITH SPECIAL CARE BY OTHERS FOR SIGNS OF BIAS -- NOT TO MENTION GENUINE INDEPENDENCE OF ANALYSIS FROM OPERATIONS BUTTRESSED BY INTERNAL AGENCY RIVALRIES.

-- POLICYMAKERS' IMPATIENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE -- WITH CIA -- IS INTENSIFIED BY THE FACT THAT WE ARE SOMETIMES WRONG IN OUR ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS, AND WE OFTEN CHANGE OUR ASSESSMENTS BASED ON NEW ANALYSIS OR INFORMATION. WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE ERROR GRACEFULLY,

AND OFTEN DO NOT FOREWARN POLICYMAKERS OF REVISED VIEWS BEFORE THE INFORMATION HITS THE STREET. A POLICYMAKER WHO HAS MADE DECISIONS BASED ON ONE ASSESSMENT ONLY TO SEE IT CHANGE OR TO FIND IT WAS WRONG WILL NOT THINK FONDLY OF US OR SOON WISH AGAIN TO PROCEED ON OUR ASSURANCES OR ASSESSMENTS.

AT THE SAME TIME, AS HARKABI POINTS OUT, "THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IS AWARE THAT IT TREADS ON PRECARIOUS GROUND AND IS LIABLE TO BE SINGLED OUT FOR BLAME IN ANY ERROR, SINCE IN EVERY POLITICAL OR MILITARY DECISION THERE IS AN ASSUMPTION ON THE SITUATION OR A COMPONENT OF KNOWLEDGE, THE LACK OF WHICH CAN BE IMPUTED TO INTELLIGENCE". THUS, "THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IS USUALLY A FRIGHTENED INSTITUTION" WHERE "... ERROR OF EVALUATION IS ALWAYS ENSHRINED IN ITS BILL OF INDICTMENT." HE CONCLUDES THAT "WHEREAS THE POPULAR SAYING HAS IT THAT 'TO ERR IS HUMAN,' AN ALMOST SUPERHUMAN PERFECTION IS EXPECTED OF INTELLIGENCE." I HAVE TO ADMIT, HOWEVER, THAT BY THE ASSURANCE, EVEN ARROGANCE, WITH WHICH WE EXPRESS OUR VIEWS, WE INVITE HARSH CRITICISM WHEN WE ARE WRONG. WE NEED TO BE MORE HONEST -- HUMBLE IF YOU WILL -- ABOUT OUR UNCERTAINTIES, OUR GAPS IN INFORMATION AND OUR REAL LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN WHAT WE SAY.

- AS I SUGGESTED EARLIER, A SPECIAL CRITICISM BY POLICYMAKERS IS THAT CIA IS TOO FREQUENTLY A VOICE OF GLOOM AND DOOM. FOR POLICYMAKERS WHO MUST TRY TO FIND SOLUTIONS FOR INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS OR A WAY OUT OF A NO-WIN SITUATION, OUR FOREBODINGS AND POINTING OUT OF PERILS AND DANGERS ARE OF LITTLE HELP AND ARE HIGHLY AGGRAVATING. THIS IS A VALID COMPLAINT.

- FINALLY, CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS IS A SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR POLICYMAKERS FOR SEVERAL REASONS, AND PROFOUNDLY INFLUENCES OUR ROLE. FIRST, VIRTUALLY ALL CIA ASSESSMENTS GO TO THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES. MOST GO ALSO TO THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES. LAST YEAR, CIA GAVE SOME 1600 BRIEFINGS ON CAPITOL HILL. AS A RESULT, AND THANKS TO THEIR STAFFS, MANY SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES ARE BETTER INFORMED ABOUT CIA'S INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS ON A GIVEN SUBJECT THAN THE POLICYMAKER. AND THAT INTELLIGENCE IS OFTEN USED TO CRITICIZE AND CHALLENGE POLICY, TO SET ONE AGENCY AGAINST ANOTHER, AND TO EXPOSE DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN AN ADMINISTRATION. WHEN CONTEMPLATING HISTORICAL WATERSHEDS SUCH AS WATERGATE AND VIETNAM THAT ALTERED THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, I BELIEVE A THIRD FORCE WAS EQUALIZING THE TWO BRANCHES' ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE IN THE MID-1970S.

SECOND, THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS HAS GIVEN CONGRESS -- ESPECIALLY THE TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES -- FAR GREATER INFLUENCE AND EVEN CONTROL OVER THE WAY CIA AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES SPEND THEIR MONEY THAN ANYONE IN THE EXECUTIVE WOULD DREAM OF EXERCISING: FROM EXPENDITURES IN THE BILLIONS TO LINE ITEMS IN THE THOUSANDS. CONGRESS HAS BEEN IMMENSELY SUPPORTIVE AND STEADFAST IN PROVIDING THE RESOURCES OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS TO REBUILD AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. BUT IT CAUSES POLICYMAKERS HEARTBURN TO KNOW THAT CONGRESS IN FACT HAS MORE INFLUENCE TODAY OVER OUR PRIORITIES AND HOW WE SPEND OUR MONEY THAN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

FINALLY, THE POLICYMAKER KNOWS THAT THERE IS LITTLE THAT HE CAN ASK CIA TO DO THAT WILL NOT BE SHARED WITH THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES. AND CONTRARY TO WHAT YOU MAY READ, THIS IS NOT NEW.

THE RESULT OF THESE REALITIES IS THAT CIA TODAY IS IN A REMARKABLE POSITION, POISED NEARLY EQUIDISTANT BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES -- THE FORMER KNOWING THAT CIA IS IN NO POSITION TO WITHHOLD MUCH FROM CONGRESS AND IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO IT, AND THE LATTER WITH GREAT INFLUENCE AND INFORMATION YET SUSPICIOUS, MISTRUSTFUL AND CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT CIA

AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH MIGHT BE COOKING UP. THIS MAY BE OR MAY NOT BE HISTORICALLY CHARACTERISTIC OF OTHER EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS' RELATIONSHIPS WITH CONGRESS, ALTHOUGH I SUSPECT NOT. REGARDLESS, SUCH A DOMINANT LEGISLATIVE ROLE WITH RESPECT TO AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IS UNIQUE IN OUR HISTORY AND IN THE WORLD. AND OUR POLICYMAKERS KNOW IT.

NOW, LET ME TURN TO CIA'S ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POLICYMAKER AS SEEN FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT.

-- ONE OF OUR GREATEST CONCERNS OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN THE UNWILLINGNESS OF MOST POLICYMAKERS TO SPEND MUCH TIME ON INTELLIGENCE. THEIR EXPECTATIONS ARE GREAT AND COMPLAINTS LOUD, BUT FOR MANY YEARS WE HAVE STRUGGLED LARGELY IN VAIN TO GET POLICY OFFICIALS TO DEVOTE TIME TO INTELLIGENCE ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, WE WORK HARD TO DETERMINE THEIR REQUIREMENTS -- WHAT ARE THEIR PRIORITIES, WHAT ISSUES OR PROBLEMS SHOULD WE ADDRESS, HOW CAN WE HELP? ONE REASON CONGRESS HAS ASSUMED A LARGER ROLE IN THESE AREAS, IN MY VIEW, IS BECAUSE POLICYMAKERS FOR YEARS HAVE ABDICATED THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. TRYING TO GET SENIOR POLICY PRINCIPALS TO MEETINGS EVEN ONCE A YEAR TO DISCUSS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS IS A EXERCISE IN FRUSTRATION. BEYOND THE LACK OF HELP ON REQUIREMENTS,

WE GET LITTLE FEEDBACK ON WHAT WE DO, GOOD OR BAD, TO HELP US BE MORE RESPONSIVE. WE HAVE BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE IN RECENT YEARS IN TRYING TO ENGAGE POLICYMAKERS ON THESE MATTERS, AND SOME KEY FIGURES IN THIS ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN MORE ACCESSIBLE THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS, BUT THERE IS STILL A GREAT VOID.

-- IN PART BECAUSE OF AN UNWILLINGNESS TO SPEND TIME ON INTELLIGENCE, TOO MANY POLICYMAKERS EARLY ON HAVE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DO THAT, WHEN DISAPPOINTED, TURN TO SKEPTICISM WHETHER WE CAN DO ANYTHING.

-- WE FIND MOST POLICYMAKERS SO FOCUSED ON CURRENT PROBLEMS THAT THERE IS TOO OFTEN A RELUCTANCE TO LOOK AHEAD SEVERAL STEPS OR TO PAY ATTENTION TO LONGER TERM PROBLEMS WE IDENTIFY. IF, AS I HAVE BEEN TOLD, THE AVERAGE TENURE OF AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN GOVERNMENT IS 21 MONTHS, SUCH A SHORT TERM FOCUS IS UNDERSTANDABLE BUT LAMENTABLE, AND, ULTIMATELY, COSTLY TO THE COUNTRY.

-- IN THIS CONNECTION, WE FIND THAT TOO MANY POLICYMAKERS ARE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO TAKE THE TIME TO READ OR BE BRIEFED ON AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE EXCEPT ON CURRENT ISSUES.

-- FINALLY, IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE OVER THE YEARS THAT THE POLICYMAKERS' RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE THEY DISAGREE WITH OR FIND UNPALATABLE IS EITHER TO IGNORE IT; TO CHARACTERIZE IT AS INCOMPLETE, TOO NARROWLY FOCUSED OR AS INCOMPETENT; OR TO CHARGE THAT IT IS "COOKED" OR REFLECTS A CIA BIAS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ALLEGATION BY A FORMER NSC ADVISER THAT CIA HAD NO INFORMATION ON INTERNAL IRANIAN POLITICS IN 1985 IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. THERE WERE PUBLISHED INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS AVAILABLE THEN THAT WE NOW KNOW DESCRIBED WITH CONSIDERABLE ACCURACY THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE IN IRAN. THEY JUST WERE IGNORED OR DISREGARDED. WHEN POLICYMAKERS SUSPECT THEY WILL GET AN ASSESSMENT THEY DON'T LIKE, THEY OFTEN WILL ASK ONLY FOR DATA -- NO ANALYSIS -- OR TRY TO FRAME THE QUESTION IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CHANNEL THE ANSWER. AS PROFESSOR HARKABI NOTES, WHAT THE POLICYMAKER OFTEN LOOKS FOR "IS NOT SO MUCH DATA ON THE BASIS OF WHICH TO SHAPE POLICY BUT RATHER SUPPORT FOR PRE-FORMED POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS." IN 21 YEARS IN INTELLIGENCE, I HAVE NEVER HEARD A POLICYMAKER (OR ANYONE ELSE) CHARACTERIZE AS BIASED OR COOKED A CIA ASSESSMENT WITH WHICH HE AGREED.

THERE IS NO CHARGE TO WHICH WE IN CIA ARE MORE SENSITIVE THAN THAT OF "COOKING" INTELLIGENCE -- OF SLANTING OUR

REPORTING TO SUPPORT POLICY. EVERY DIRECTOR SINCE I JOINED CIA HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF THIS AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, I BELIEVE IN VIRTUALLY ALL INSTANCES UNFAIRLY. FIRST, ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL VIEWS. NATIONAL ESTIMATES ARE REVIEWED AND COORDINATED BY A DOZEN AGENCIES; CIA ASSESSMENTS ARE WIDELY REVIEWED INSIDE THE AGENCY BUT ALMOST NEVER EVEN SEEN BY THE DIRECTOR BEFORE BEING PUBLISHED AND CIRCULATED. AS NOTED EARLIER, VIRTUALLY ALL GO TO SEVERAL COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS, WHERE THEY ARE SCRUTINIZED.

THESE FORMAL PRODUCTS MUST BE DISTINGUISHED FROM PERSONAL VIEWS EXPRESSED BY INDIVIDUALS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE AGENCY, FROM ANALYST TO SENIOR OPERATIONS OFFICER TO DIRECTOR. MORE THAN ONCE, DCI CASEY (AND PERHAPS HIS PREDECESSORS) APPROVED AN ESTIMATE WITH WHICH HE DISAGREED PERSONALLY, AND SEPARATELY CONVEYED HIS PERSONAL VIEW TO POLICYMAKERS. LEST THIS RAISE EYEBROWS, I REMIND YOU THAT IN 1962 DCI MCCONE DISAGREED WITH THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON WHETHER THERE WERE MISSILE IN CUBA. HE TOLD PRESIDENT KENNEDY THEY WERE THERE, AND HE ALONE WAS RIGHT. AS LONG AS ALL POINTS OF VIEW ARE FAIRLY REPRESENTED AND REPORTED, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -- THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF INTELLIGENCE ADVISER -- IS ENTITLED TO HAVE AND TO PUT FORWARD HIS OWN VIEW.

POLICYMAKERS HAVE ALWAYS LIKED INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTED WHAT THEY WANT TO DO, AND THEY OFTEN TRY TO INFLUENCE THE ANALYSIS TO COME TO CONCLUSIONS THEY WANT. THEY ASK CAREFULLY PHRASED QUESTIONS; THEY SOMETIMES WITHHOLD INFORMATION; THEY BROADEN OR NARROW THE ISSUE; ON RARE OCCASIONS, THEY EVEN TRY TO INTIMIDATE. THIS IS WHERE THE INTEGRITY OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, BOLSTERED BY A NATURAL TENDENCY TO RESIST PRESSURE AND AN OFTEN ADVERSARIAL BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIP, COMES INTO PLAY TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ASSESSMENT.

BUT, YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE GIVE AND TAKE -- THE DIALOGUE -- BETWEEN POLICYMAKER AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON ISSUES IS NORMAL, HEALTHY, AND OFTEN IMPROVES THE ASSESSMENT AND MAKES IT MORE USEFUL TO THE POLICYMAKER -- EVEN WHILE ITS OBJECTIVITY IS PRESERVED. WE KNOW THEY ARE OFTEN TRYING TO INFLUENCE AN ASSESSMENT, BUT THAT DOES NOT RENDER THEIR INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS IRRELEVANT OR OFF-LIMITS. FOR US, THERE ARE TWO IRREVOCABLE CAVEATS: INTELLIGENCE MUST NEVER SERVE AS AN ADVOCATE OF ONE SET OF POLICIES OVER ANOTHER, OR TAKE SIDES IN THE POLICY DEBATE.

A FINAL THOUGHT. TO ATTEMPT TO SLANT INTELLIGENCE NOT ONLY TRANGRESSES THE DEEPEST ETHICAL AND CULTURAL PRINCIPLE OF CIA, WE ALL KNOW IT WOULD ALSO BE FOOLISH -- IT WOULD PRESUPPOSE A SINGLE POINT OF VIEW IN AN ADMINISTRATION AND WOULD IGNORE THE

REALITY OF THE CONGRESSIONAL READERSHIP. INDEED, IN MY OPINION, SHARING THE SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH CONGRESS AS WELL AS THE EXECUTIVE IS ONE OF THE SUREST GUARANTEES OF CIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY.

CONCLUSION

WHAT I HAVE TRIED TO DESCRIBE TONIGHT IS THE REALITY OF CIA'S ROLE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. I HAVE TRIED TO GO BEYOND THE MECHANICS AND THE HEADLINES TO IDENTIFY THE STRESSES, TENSIONS, RIVALRIES, ENDURING COMPLAINTS AND RELATIONSHIPS -- THE PULLING AND HAULING DAY IN AND DAY OUT -- THAT DETERMINE CIA'S ROLE AND ITS IMPACT. SOME OF OUR ANALYSES ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS; SOME INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS; SOME ESTIMATES ALLEGED TO BE POLITICIZED WERE NOT THAT AT ALL -- THEY WERE JUST NOT VERY WELL DONE. BUT UNEVENNESS OF QUALITY SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH POLITICIZATION. CIA'S AUTONOMY IN OUR GOVERNMENT IS UNIQUE IN WASHINGTON; ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGISLATURE IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE ARE A DYNAMIC BLEND OF SUPPORT AND RIVALRY, OF COOPERATION AND CONFLICT. OUR CHALLENGE IS TO MANAGE THOSE RELATIONSHIPS SO THAT THE WHOLE RANGE OF INTERACTIONS -- SUPPORTIVE AND ADVERSARIAL -- NET OUT TO PROMOTE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF AN EVER MORE COMPLEX WORLD AROUND US AND HENCE BETTER INFORMED DECISIONS AND POLICY.

THE REAL INTELLIGENCE STORY IN RECENT YEARS IS THE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT, WITH HELP FROM BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, IN THE QUALITY, RELEVANCE AND TIMELINESS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE POLICYMAKER -- A STORY THAT HAS BEEN NEGLECTED IN PREFERENCE TO CONTROVERSIAL COVERT ACTIONS, PROBLEMS BETWEEN CIA AND THE CONGRESS, AND SPY SCANDALS. WE UNDERSTAND THIS POLITICAL REALITY, BUT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT AMERICANS KNOW THAT OUR PRIMARY MISSION REMAINS THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. THIS IS OUR PRIMARY ROLE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND WE CARRY IT OUT WITH INTEGRITY, DEDICATION, AND SKILL. THE PRESIDENT, THE POLICY COMMUNITY, AND THE CONGRESS -- SOMETIMES WITH CLENCHED TEETH -- DEPEND UPON US, TASK US, AND LOOK TO US MORE EACH DAY. WE ATTRACT AMERICA'S BRIGHTEST YOUNG PEOPLE, WHO FIND WITH US EXCEPTIONALLY CHALLENGING, HONORABLE, AND CONSISTENTLY FASCINATING CAREERS.

THE UNITED STATES HAS THE FINEST GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD. IT HELPS TO SAFEGUARD OUR FREEDOMS AGAINST OUR ADVERSARIES AND HELPS THE POLICYMAKER UNDERSTAND AND DEAL WITH THE OFTEN DANGEROUS WORLD AROUND US. CIA IS TRULY AMERICA'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE -- ITS EYES AND EARS. AND, I ASSURE YOU, OUR DEEPEST COMMITMENT, TO BORROW A PHRASE USED TO DESCRIBE GEORGE MARSHALL, IS "TO SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER" -- AT LEAST THE TRUTH AS WE HONESTLY UNDERSTAND IT.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**ROUTING SLIP**

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Executive Secretary

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Henry S. Bienen, *Director*
James S. McDonnell Distinguished
University Professor

May 27, 1987

Mr. Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Thank you for your letter of May 20th and your acceptance of our invitation to come to Princeton. I and my colleagues and students very much look forward to this occasion. If you have any questions, please let me know. I told [redacted] that I would be out of the country until mid-July but I will then be available in Princeton.

25X1

Sincerely,



Henry Bienen

HB:gs

P-310-15

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Central Intelligence Agency

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Dr. Henry S. Bienen, Director
Center of International Studies
Corwin Hall
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey 08544

Dear Dr. Bienen:

I accept with pleasure the invitation to address the Woodrow Wilson School Conference at Princeton University on Tuesday, 29 September. The opportunity to speak with these outstanding students and faculty members is an honor. I look forward to participating in this academic evening.

Sincerely,

/s/ Robert M. Gates

Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence



P-210-112




Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
(703) 482-7676

George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs

1 May 1987

ADCI:

Please sign the letter of acceptance
opposite. Professor Bienen said he would
appreciate a letter of acceptance from you.



George V. Lauder

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26 March 1987

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs Office

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SUBJECT: Invitation to Speak at the Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs Princeton University

1. Action Requested: Accept or decline an invitation to be the first visiting speaker at the Woodrow Wilson School Conference at Princeton University on 22 September, 29 September (preferred), or 6 October.

2. Background: Dr. Henry S. Bienen, a James S. McDonnell Distinguished University Professor at Princeton, and Director of the Center of International Studies, has invited you to be the first visiting speaker at the Woodrow Wilson School Conference. Dr. Bienen also is a consultant for the Agency and publicly identifies himself as such. (See biography and bibliography opposite.) Dr. Bienen is conducting this conference (a 12-week course for about 20 undergraduate students that is likely to include several foreign nationals) on the role of intelligence agencies in foreign policy formulation and implementation, and would wish you to address the "Role of Intelligence in Foreign Policymaking" or any of the other topics on which he will ask the students to develop policy positions. These will include Congressional oversight, the organization of intelligence communities and their relationship to executive authority, the relationship of intelligence to general foreign policy formulation, and the specific concerns that relate to intelligence acquisition in a democracy. According to Dr. Bienen, this conference was planned long before the current Iran/Nicaragua problems.

If you accept this invitation, here are the options suggested by Dr. Bienen:

Option #1: An hour public lecture 4:30 - 5:30 p.m. followed by 15 minutes of Questions and Answers at the Woodrow Wilson Auditorium before an audience of 250 - 300 including Woodrow Wilson faculty members, graduate and undergraduate students. Print media and foreign nationals also would be in the audience. Although you would be on closed circuit TV in the school, neither commercial TV nor radio would cover the event. Dr. Bienen suggests that you may wish to make a policy speech, as you did at Harvard. After the public speech, you would then meet for a private dinner with the 20 - 25 Woodrow Wilson School Conference faculty and students at the faculty club and then adjourn for post dinner discussion of topics covered at the public lecture. Prepared remarks would not be necessary, unless you wished to make additional ones.

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Option #2: Restrict the audience by invitation to approximately 60 - 70 Woodrow Wilson School students and faculty and hold the lecture in a "bowl" room at the school. The proposed format is one hour of remarks followed by 15 minutes of Questions and Answers. Although the media would not be invited, given the makeup of the student body, foreign nationals would be present. The dinner and meeting afterwards would be the same format as in option #1.

Option #3: Meet for dinner with the 20 - 25 conference students and members of the faculty at the Princeton Faculty Club and then adjourn to a conference room for 30 minutes of prepared remarks followed by an hour and a half discussion period.

The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs was established in 1930 in memory of an alumnus and professor who became president of the University, then governor of New Jersey, and then, President of the United States. According to the brochure, the Undergraduate Policy Conference is one of the most distinctive features of the school's program. The conference is designed to train students (juniors and seniors) in the investigation of domestic and international issues of public policy, in methods of current bibliography and interviewing, in writing clearly under the pressure of a tight deadline, in public speaking and debate, and in the arts of group deliberation and decisionmaking.


Organization of the conference is often modeled on the research staff of a presidential commission or other independent investigating groups. According to the brochure, the school believes that graduates entering government service, law, journalism, academic research, and teaching will need skills which the conference builds. The topics of policy conferences change from year to year ranging from arms control to the US automobile industry. Andy Marshall, Director, Office of Net Assessment, DOD, is scheduled to speak to the conference. Dr. Bienen said that he also will invite someone from the staff of the Senate Select Committee or Senator Roth, Senator Boren, or Congressman Hamilton. Former President Jimmy Carter, Secretary of State George Shultz, and Director of Arms Control Kenneth Adelman have given public addresses at previous conferences. (See brochure opposite for further information.)

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Student protests in May 1985 at Princeton included anti-apartheid demonstrations and a demand that the board of trustees divest holdings in companies that do business with South Africa.

3. Recommendation: If you wish to speak to an academic group, the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs is a prestigious school and would be a fruitful source for recruits. Since foreign students will attend the meetings, a strictly off-the-record address does not seem feasible. Please indicate your preference below and Public Affairs will make the appropriate response.



George V. Lauder

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ACCEPT:

____ 22 September ☒ 29 September (preferred) ____ 6 October

☒ Option #1. Public address of 250 - 300 attendees followed by private dinner and discussion.

____ Option #2. Address 60 - 70 invitees followed by private dinner and discussion.

____ Option #3. Private dinner for 20 - 25 conference participants followed by remarks and discussion.

/s/ Robert M. Gates

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: 9/27/85

DECLINE:

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: _____

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